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I. INTRODUCTION 
Employment discrimination is notoriously hard to prove.1 From 
the scarcity of evidence2 to the skepticism of jurors,3 plaintiffs in 
employment discrimination or employment retaliation cases face an 
uphill battle to prove that a discharge or demotion was caused by 
unlawful animus. Fortunately for Minnesota plaintiffs, however, 
Minnesota courts have long employed a causation test that is more 
plaintiff-friendly than the norm under many federal statutes. Under 
the burden-shifting test established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green,4  and adopted under many Minnesota workplace statutes, 
plaintiffs can demonstrate causation simply by demonstrating that 
unlawful animus was a “motivating factor” in an employment 
decision.5 This standard is less stringent than the standard typically 
employed under federal statutes such as the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA), which requires plaintiffs to show that 
unlawful animus was the “but-for” cause of an employment 
decision.6  
Nonetheless, Minnesota and federal cases have sometimes 
blurred the line between Minnesota’s relaxed standard and the more 
stringent but-for standard. Some Minnesota cases have applied a 
functional “but-for” test by requiring plaintiffs to prove that an 
employer had no motive besides unlawful animus. 7  The Eighth 
                                                 
1.  Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to 
Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 558 (2001).  
2.  Id. at 570. 
3.  David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Verdicts Matter: An Empirical Study of 
California Employment Discrimination and Wrongful Discharge Jury Verdicts 
Reveals Low Success Rates for Women and Minorities, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
511, 556 (2003).  
4.  411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
5.  McGrath v. TCF Bank Savs., 509 N.W.2d 365, 366 (1993). 
6.  Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177–78 (2009). 
7.  See, e.g., Schmidgall v. FilmTec Corp., No. CX-01-1722, 2002 WL 655680, 
at *3–4 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2002), aff’d on other grounds, 644 N.W.2d 801 
(Minn. 2002) (reversing district court’s determination that employee could not 
demonstrate retaliation because retaliatory animus was not the sole cause of 
employee’s discharge), aff’d on other grounds, 644 N.W.2d 801 (Minn. 2002). 
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Circuit routinely applies a similar test to discrimination and 
retaliation claims arising under Minnesota law.8 
Clarity is needed from Minnesota’s courts or its legislature 
regarding the applicable causation standard for discrimination and 
retaliation claims under Minnesota law. The motivating-factor test 
is preferable to the but-for test in view of the employee-protective 
policies underlying Minnesota’s workplace discrimination and 
retaliation statutes. A motivating-factor standard also better 
accounts for the practical reality that employers often have multiple 
reasons for making a single employment decision.9 
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE MCDONNELL DOUGLAS TEST AND 
CAUSATION STANDARDS UNDER FEDERAL LAW 
Numerous federal workplace statutes prohibit employers from 
discriminating against employees based on characteristics such as 
age, pregnancy, race, and gender, and from retaliating against them 
based on statutorily-protected conduct such as whistleblowing. The 
best-known federal antidiscrimination statutes are Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964,10 the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA), 11  and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA). 12  Others include the Pregnancy Discrimination Act 
(PDA), which amended Title VII to include pregnancy 
discrimination as a type of sex discrimination; 13  the Uniformed 
Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), 
which promotes reemployment of employees returning from active 
military duty; 14  the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act 
(GINA), which prohibits employers from taking adverse action 
                                                 
8.  See, e.g., Naguib v. Trimark Hotel Corp., 903 F.3d 806, 811–12 (8th Cir. 
2018); Pedersen v. Bio-Medical Applications of Minn., 775 F.3d 1049, 1056 (8th 
Cir. 2015). 
9.  See Anderson v. Hunter, Keith, Marshall, & Co., 417 N.W.2d 619, 626 
(1988) (a but-for test permits employers who engage in unlawful discrimination 
to escape liability by proving that “other legitimate reasons may coincidentally 
exist that could have justified” the employer’s discriminatory action). 
10.  42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (1964). 
11.  Id. §§ 12101–12213 (1990). 
12.  29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (1967). 
13.  Pub. L. No. 95–555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(k) (1976 
& Supp. 1 1978)). 
14.  38 U.S.C. §§ 4301–4335 (1994). 
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against employees because of genetic information; 15  and the 
Rehabilitation Act, which prohibits disability-based discrimination 
in federally-funded programs and institutions. 16  Other federal 
statutes, such as the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)17 and the 
Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA),18 forbid retaliation against 
employees who engage in statutorily-protected conduct such as 
participating in workplace investigations or taking medical leave.19 
All of these workplace statutes protect employees’ civil rights 
in the workplace. However, they are more complex than typical tort 
claims20 because they involve not only an employer’s actions, but 
also its motivations.21 An employment discrimination or retaliation 
plaintiff must generally prove not only that his employer acted in a 
certain way (for example, by discharging him), but that the 
employer acted for the wrong reasons (discriminatory or retaliatory 
animus). 22  This makes discrimination and retaliation claims 
different from typical tort actions such as negligence, where a 
plaintiff need only prove objective factors like causation and 
damages. In a discrimination or retaliation case, a plaintiff must at 
                                                 
15.  42 U.S.C. §§ 2000ff–2000ff-11 (2008). 
16.  29 U.S.C. §§ 701–797 (1973). 
17.  Id. §§ 201–219 (1938). 
18.  Id. §§ 2601–2654 (1993). 
19.  See id. § 218c(a); see also id. §§ 2612(a), 2615(a).  
20 .  Scholars have questioned whether federal civil-rights laws should be 
characterized as tort laws. See, e.g., Sandra F. Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, 
the Common Law, and Proximate Cause, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (2013); Martha 
Chamallas, Discrimination and Outrage: The Migration from Civil Rights to Tort 
Law, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2115 (2007). Nonetheless, the United States 
Supreme Court has characterized USERRA as a federal tort law, see Staub v. 
Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 417 (2011), and drew heavily on tort-law concepts 
of agency and causation to decide a question of vicarious liability under Title VII, 
see generally Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998). It characterized 
Title VII’s retaliation provisions as tort claims. Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. 
Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 346 (2013). State courts have routinely treated employment 
retaliation as a tort. See, e.g., Ackerman v. Iowa, 913 N.W.2d 610, 618 (Iowa 
2015) (citation omitted); Abraham v. Cty. of Hennepin, 639 N.W.2d 342, 352 
(Minn. 2002), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 639 N.W.2d 342 
(Minn. 2002); Continental Coffee Products Co. v. Cazarez, 937 S.W.2d 444, 453 
(Tex. 1996); Chavez v. Manville Prods., 777 P.2d 371, 377 (N.M. 1989). 
21 .  See Anastasia Niedrich, Removing Categorical Constraints on Equal 
Employment Opportunities and Anti-Discrimination Protections, 18 MICH. J. 
GENDER & L. 25, 52 (2011) (citations omitted). 
22.  Id. at 52–54. 
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least raise an inference about a subjective factor—an employer’s 
motivation for treating the plaintiff in a certain way.23  
Recognizing the difficulty of directly proving an employer’s 
subjective motivation, in McDonnell Douglas, the United States 
Supreme Court established a burden-shifting test by which a 
plaintiff may create an inference of subjective motivation.24 The test 
has three stages. At the first stage, the plaintiff makes out a prima 
facie case of discrimination or retaliation.25 For discrimination, the 
prima facie case generally involves showing that the plaintiff had a 
protected characteristic (such as age over forty or membership in a 
racial minority), that she was qualified for or was satisfactorily 
performing her job duties, and that she suffered an adverse 
employment action (such as discharge or failure to hire). 26  For 
retaliation, the prima facie case typically requires a plaintiff to show 
statutorily-protected activity (such as whistleblowing or reporting 
harassment), an adverse employment action (such as a discharge or 
demotion), and a causal connection between the two.27 Second, the 
employer may proffer a nondiscriminatory or nonretaliatory 
explanation for the adverse action.28 Finally, the employee has a 
chance to show that the employer’s proffered reason was pretext.29 
While the McDonnell Douglas test originated under Title VII, the 
test has been applied under several other federal workplace 
antidiscrimination laws and antiretaliation laws.30  
                                                 
23.  Id.; see also Phyllis Tropper Baumann et al., Substance in the Shadow of 
Procedure: The Integration of Substantive and Procedural Law in Title VII 
Cases, 33 B.C. L REV. 211, 229–30 (1992). 
24.  McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973). 
25.  Id. at 802. 
26.  See, e.g., Bonilla-Ramirez v. MVM, Inc., 904 F.3d 88, 94 (1st Cir. 2018) 
(citations omitted); Faulkner v. Douglas Cty., 906 F.3d 728, 732 (8th Cir. 2018) 
(citing Pye v. Nu Aire, Inc., 641 F.3d 1011, 1019 (8th Cir. 2011)); Roberson-
King v. Louisiana Workforce Comm’n, 904 F.3d 377, 381 (5th Cir. 2018) 
(citations omitted). 
27.  See, e.g., Gillispie v. RegionalCare Hosp. Partners, 892 F.3d 585, 593 (3rd 
Cir. 2018) (citing Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 776 F.3d 181, 193 (3rd Cir. 
2015)); Rutledge v. SunTrust Bank, 262 F.Appx. 956, 969 (11th Cir. 2008) 
(citations omitted). 
28.  McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.  
29.  Id. at 804. 
30.  See, e.g., Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S.Ct. 1338, 1353 (2015) 
(PDA); Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 51–52 (2003) (ADA); Batson 
v. Salvation Army, 897 F.3d 1320, 1328–29 (11th Cir. 2018) (retaliation under 
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The first stage of the McDonnell Douglas test—the prima facie 
stage—presents a relatively low hurdle for plaintiffs. Its key 
elements are that the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment 
action and that “the most common explanations for an adverse 
employment action, such as incompetence, are not applicable.”31 A 
plaintiff will generally have firsthand knowledge if he has suffered 
an adverse employment action, such as a demotion or a discharge. 
Additionally, requirements at the prima facie stage are intended to 
be de minimis, since the purpose of the prima facie stage is merely 
to create a rebuttable presumption of discrimination or retaliation.32 
The employer’s burden of production is even lighter. The employer 
must merely articulate a nondiscriminatory or nonretaliatory reason 
for its actions and is not yet subject to any credibility analysis.33 
Accordingly, the critical stage of the McDonnell Douglas test is the 
third stage, commonly called the “pretext stage.”34 At this stage, the 
credibility of the employer’s asserted reason is tested against the 
strength of the presumption created by the plaintiff’s prima facie 
case.35 The plaintiff can prevail “either directly by persuading the 
court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the 
employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered 
explanation is unworthy of credence.”36  
The recent trend under federal statutes has been to impose a but-
for test at the pretext stage—that is, to require the plaintiff to show 
that the adverse action would not have occurred but for the 
                                                 
the FMLA); Ortiz v. City of San Antonio Fire Dep’t, 806 F.3d 822, 827 (5th Cir. 
2015) (finding no error where a district court used McDonnell Douglas to analyze 
a claim of retaliation under the GINA); Conner v. Schnuck Mkts., Inc., 121 F.3d 
1390, 1394 (10th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted) (retaliation under the FLSA); 
Burns v. City of Columbus, 91 F.3d 836, 843 (6th Cir. 1996) (Rehabilitation Act). 
31.  Hutson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 63 F.3d 771, 776 (8th Cir. 1995) 
(citing Krenik v. Cty. of Le Seuer, 47 F.3d 953, 958 (8th Cir. 1995)). 
32.  Development in the Law: Employment Discrimination, Shifting Burdens of 
Proof in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1579, 1587 
(1996). 
33.  St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509 (1993); see also Shifting 
Burdens, supra note 32, at 1587 (“[T]his second stage is little more than a 
mechanical formality; a defendant, unless silent, will almost always prevail” 
(citing Hicks, 509 U.S. at 510–11)). 
34.  Shifting Burdens, supra note 32, at 1581. 
35.  Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981). 
36.  Id. 
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employer’s discriminatory or retaliatory animus.37 Justifications for 
the but-for test vary. For example, under the ADEA, the Supreme 
Court has based its logic on the statutory text, holding that the 
ADEA’s prohibition on discrimination “because of” age means that 
discrimination must be a but-for cause of the employer’s actions.38 
Federal appellate courts have applied the same analysis to the 
ADA.39 On the other hand, in deciding that Title VII retaliation 
requires but-for causation, the Supreme Court looked to statutory-
construction principles.40 
Notably, the “but-for” standard does not apply to discrimination 
claims under Title VII. 41  While the but-for standard originally 
applied to all causes of action under Title VII,42 in 1991, Congress 
enacted a more relaxed “motivating-factor” standard for claims of 
discrimination under Title VII.43 The motivating-factor standard is 
specific to Title VII and does not apply to other federal statutes. 
Retaliation plaintiffs under Title VII must still meet the but-for 
standard.44 
One final note on federal statutes is needed to clarify the 
difference between so-called “single-motive” and “mixed-motive” 
cases. Federal case law has sometimes distinguished between 
“mixed-motive” cases—where an employer had multiple reasons 
for taking a particular action—and “single-motive” cases.45 While 
                                                 
37.  See, e.g., Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 343 (2013) 
(retaliation under Title VII); Batson v. Salvation Army, 897 F.3d 1320, 1328–29 
(11th Cir. 2018) (retaliation under the FMLA); Gentry v. E. W. Partners Club 
Mgmt. Co., 816 F.3d 228, 235–36 (4th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted) (ADA); 
Conner v. Schnuck Mkts., Inc., 121 F.3d 1390, 1394 (10th Cir. 1997) (retaliation 
under the FLSA). Notably, the Seventh Circuit has interpreted Gross v. FBL Fin. 
Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009), as mandating a default but-for causation for all 
federal claims where the controlling statute does not incorporate explicit 
motivating-factor language. Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 
957, 961–62 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Fairley v. Andrews, 578 F.3d 518, 525–26 
(7th Cir. 2009) (en banc)). 
38.  Gross, 557 U.S. at 176–78. 
39.  Gentry, 816 F.3d at 235–36; Serwatka, 591 F.3d at 961–62 (7th Cir. 2010). 
40.  Nassar, 570 U.S. at 354. 
41.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m); see also Nassar, 570 U.S. at 343. 
42.  See Nassar, 570 U.S. at 348 (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 
228, 258 (1989)). 
43.  Pub. L. 102–166, 105 Stat. 1075 (1991). 
44.  Nassar, 570 U.S. at 360. 
45.  See, e.g., Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 246–47. 
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the applications of the McDonnell Douglas test in each situation are 
beyond the scope of this article, the difference is irrelevant for 
purposes of comparison with Minnesota law, because Minnesota 
does not distinguish between mixed-motive and single-motive cases 
when applying the McDonnell Douglas test.46 
III. ADOPTION OF THE MCDONNELL DOUGLAS TEST AND 
DEVELOPMENT OF CAUSATION STANDARDS UNDER MINNESOTA LAW 
Like federal law, Minnesota has enacted numerous statutory 
schemes to combat workplace discrimination and retaliation. The 
Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA) 47  prohibits workplace 
discrimination based on “race, color, creed, religion, national origin, 
sex, marital status, status with regard to public assistance, familial 
status, membership or activity in a local commission, disability, 
sexual orientation, or age.”48 The MHRA also prohibits retaliation 
against employees who engage in statutorily-protected conduct, 
such as participating in a workplace investigation.49 The Minnesota 
Workers’ Compensation Act (MWCA) 50  prohibits retaliation 
against employees who seek workers’ compensation benefits,51 and 
the Minnesota Whistleblower Act (MWA) prohibits retaliation 
against employees who report their employers’ lawbreaking to 
governmental or law enforcement officers.52 
Minnesota has adopted the McDonnell Douglas test for cases 
involving workplace discrimination or retaliation, including cases 
arising under the MHRA, 53  the antiretaliation provisions of the 
MWCA,54 and the MWA.55 Minnesota courts have noted that the 
test translates easily to these state-law causes of action, since the 
                                                 
46.  See Pinson v. Grazzoni Bros. & Co., No. A03-1567, 2004 WL 1254117, at 
*7 (Minn. Ct. App. May 28, 2004) (citing Anderson v. Hunter, Keith, Marshall, 
& Co., 417 N.W.2d 619, 626–27 (Minn. 1988)). 
47.  MINN. STAT. §§ 363A.01–363A.44 (2018). 
48.  Id. § 363A.08, subdiv. 2. 
49.  Id. § 363A.15. 
50.  Id. §§ 176.001–176.862. 
51.  Id. § 176.82. 
52.  Id. § 181.932. 
53.  See Sigurdson v. Isanti Cty., 386 N.W.2d 715, 721 (Minn. 1986). 
54.  Randall v. N. Milk Prods., Inc., 519 N.W.2d 456, 459 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1994). 
55.  See McGrath v. TCF Bank Savs., 502 N.W.2d 801, 807 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1993), aff’d, 509 N.W.2d 365 (Minn. 1993).  
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state-law antidiscrimination and antiretaliation provisions resemble 
the causes of action in Title VII, for which the McDonnell Douglas 
test was created.56 
However, unlike several of their federal counterparts, 
Minnesota’s laws do not incorporate a but-for causation test at the 
McDonnell Douglas pretext stage. 57  Instead, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court has held that plaintiffs need only show that an 
improper animus “more likely than not” motivated the adverse 
employment action. 58  Motivating-factor causation requires the 
plaintiff to show that discriminatory animus was a factor—but not 
necessarily the only factor—in an employer’s action which is 
challenged as discriminatory or retaliatory.59 The court has twice 
rejected the but-for test on public-policy grounds, first in Anderson 
v. Hunter, Keith, Marshall, & Co.60 and later in McGrath v. TCF 
Bank Savings, FSB.61 
In Anderson, a discharged employee alleged that her discharge 
was based on pregnancy, marital status, and sex discrimination in 
violation of the MHRA.62 The plaintiff’s former employer claimed 
that the discharge was performance-based.63 The employer noted 
serious performance issues in the plaintiff’s work history, including 
misappropriation of the employer’s coupons to the plaintiff’s family 
members and billing delays which exposed the employer to 
liability.64 The trial court found both parties credible.65 The trial 
court held the employer liable for discrimination under the MHRA, 
despite its coexisting lawful motives for discharging the plaintiff.66  
                                                 
56.  Danz v. Jones, 263 N.W.2d 395, 398 (Minn. 1978) (stating that the MHRA 
is “appears to be modeled after Title VII”); Phipps v. Clark Oil & Ref. Corp., 408 
N.W.2d 569, 571–72 (Minn. 1978); McGrath, 502 N.W.2d at 807. 
57.  McGrath, 509 N.W.2d at 366. 
58.  Id. 
59.  See Anderson v. Hunter, Keith, Marshall, & Co., 417 N.W.2d 619, 626 
(Minn. 1988). 
60.  Id. at 626. 
61.  509 N.W.2d at 366. 
62.  Anderson, 417 N.W.2d at 620–21. 
63.  Id. at 622. 
64.  Id. at 621–22. 
65.  Id. at 622. 
66.  See Anderson v. Hunter, Keith, Marshall, & Co., Inc., 401 N.W.2d 75, 80 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1987, rev’d, 417 N.W.2d 619 (Minn. 1988) (stating that the trial 
court noted that “Anderson ‘clearly carried her ultimate burden for persuasion 
and convinced the Court that, though defendant’s motives were mixed, 
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The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed.67 First, the court noted 
that Anderson involved a mixed-motive claim: the trial court had 
credited both the employee’s testimony that her discharge was 
discriminatory and the employer’s testimony that the discharge was 
performance-based.68 Second, the court acknowledged that federal 
courts at the time examined mixed-motive cases by utilizing a but-
for causation standard.69 Finally, the court held that an employer 
should not be able to avoid liability for discrimination simply 
because it had a coexisting lawful motive for an otherwise-improper 
employment decision.70 A but-for test would “permit[] employers, 
definitionally guilty of prohibited employment discrimination, to 
avoid all liability for the discrimination provided they can prove that 
other legitimate reasons may coincidentally exist that could have 
justified the discharge.”71 The Minnesota Supreme Court held that 
such an outcome would undermine the “broad remedial purposes” 
of the MHRA. 72  Instead, it was sufficient for the plaintiff in 
Anderson to show that discriminatory animus was a “causative 
factor”—but not necessarily the only factor—in her employer’s 
decision to discharge her.73 
Five years later, in McGrath, a plaintiff brought a retaliatory-
discharge claim under the MWA.74 The Minnesota Supreme Court 
reiterated that an adverse action motivated by discriminatory or 
retaliatory animus is not made lawful simply because the employer 
had a coexisting lawful motive.75 The court noted that the court of 
appeals had implied that an employer could survive the McDonnell 
Douglas pretext stage in a mixed-motive case simply by 
demonstrating a coexisting, nonretaliatory motive. 76  The court 
reemphasized its holding in Anderson and rejected the notion that 
                                                 
[Anderson’s] pregnancy was a discernible, discriminatory, and causative factor 
in defendant’s discharge of [her]’”). 
67.  Anderson, 417 N.W.2d at 630.  
68.  Id. at 623. 
69.  Id. at 625–27 (quoting Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318, 1323–24 (8th Cir. 
1985); Haskins v. U.S. Dep’t of Army, 808 F.2d 1192, 1197–98 (6th Cir. 1987).  
70.  Anderson, 417 N.W.2d at 626. 
71.  Id. 
72.  Id.  
73.  Id. at 627. 
74.  McGrath v. TCF Bank Savs., 509 N.W.2d 365, 365 (Minn. 1993). 
75.  Id. at 366. 
76.  Id. 
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“an employer could avoid liability [for a discriminatory discharge] 
even if an illegitimate reason played a role in the discharge so long 
as the other proffered reason was not pretextual.”77  
Subsequent cases have applied Anderson and McGrath to 
require that plaintiffs show improper animus as a “factor,” but not 
as a sole motivation, at the pretext stage of the McDonnell Douglas 
test.78 Anderson and McGrath have never been overruled. 
A.  Application of a But-For Test at the McDonnell Douglas 
Pretext Stage in Minnesota Cases 
Despite Anderson and McGrath’s vigorous rejection of a but-
for test at the pretext stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, 
Minnesota courts have not always applied a true “motivating-
factor” test at the pretext stage. Several district courts have applied 
a but-for test which has later been reversed on appeal.79 Moreover, 
the Eighth Circuit applies a “determinative-factor” test to claims 
arising under Minnesota law which functions as a but-for test.80 
                                                 
77.  Id.  
78.  See, e.g., Carter v. Peace Officers Standards & Training Bd., 558 N.W.2d 
267, 272 (Minn. 1997); Temple v. Metro. Council, No. A17-0410, 2017 WL 
6272716, at *9 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2017); Pearson v. Rohn Indus., Inc., No. 
A15-0477, 2015 WL 9264051, at *4–5 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2015); Ley v. 
Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis, No. C5-94-2126, 1995 WL 365472, at 
*2 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 1995). 
79.  See, e.g., Holtzman v. HealthPartners Servs., Inc., No. C7-02-375, 2002 
WL 31012186, at *4–5 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 10, 2002); Schmidgall v. FilmTec 
Corp., No. CX-01-1722, 2002 WL 655680, at *2–3 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 
2002), aff’d on other grounds, 644 N.W.2d 801 (Minn. 2002); Abraham v. Cty. 
of Hennepin, No. C8-97-1907, 1998 WL 202771, at *3–4 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 
23, 1998), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 639 N.W.2d 342 
(Minn. 2002).  
80.  See Naguib v. Trimark Hotel Corp., 903 F.3d 806, 811 (8th Cir. 2018) 
(citing Pedersen v. Bio-Med. Applications of Minn., 775 F.3d 1049, 1055 (8th 
Cir. 2015)); Rothmeier v. Inv. Advisers, Inc., 85 F.3d 1328, 1328 (8th Cir. 1996). 
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1. “The” Reason Versus “a” Reason: District Courts 
Applying a But-For Test 
a. Holtzman v. HealthPartners Services, Inc.  
Joyce Holtzman was a registered nurse who was terminated by 
her employer, HealthPartners Services Inc., for failing to properly 
implement a medication protocol.81 Holtzman was sixty-one years 
old when she was terminated. 82  She brought a lawsuit for age 
discrimination, alleging that she had informed HealthPartners about 
problems with the protocol but had been ignored.83 Holtzman also 
alleged that older employees at the HealthPartners clinic where she 
worked were treated less favorably than—and often later replaced 
by—younger employees.84 
The Holtzman district court relied on the Supreme Court’s 1993 
decision in St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks.85 Hicks was a Title 
VII case decided before Congress amended Title VII to incorporate 
a motivating-factor test.86 Accordingly, Hicks had applied a but-for 
test at the McDonnell Douglas pretext stage. 87  The Holtzman 
district court cited the Hicks but-for test: “[An employer’s 
proffered] reason cannot be ‘a pretext for discrimination’ unless it 
is shown both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was 
the real reason.”88 The district court granted summary judgment for 
HealthPartners.89 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed. 90  The court of 
appeals noted that the district court’s test for pretext was “not the 
precise standard to show pretext under Minnesota law.”91 Instead, 
Holtzman needed to show only that discriminatory animus “more 
                                                 
81.  See Holtzman, 2002 WL 31012186, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 10, 2002). 
82.  Id.  
83.  See id. at *1–2.  
84.  Id. at *2. 
85.  Id. at *4 (citing St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993)). 
86.  See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 505. 
87.  See id. at 515. 
88 .  See Holtzman, 2002 WL 31012186, at *5 (Halbrooks, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Hicks, 509 U.S. at 515 (emphasis in original)). 
89.  Id. at *1. 
90.  Id. at *4.  
91.  Id. at *4. 
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likely than not” motivated her termination.92 The court of appeals 
cited McGrath’s formulation of the motivating-factor test as the 
correct test: “[E]ven if an employer has a legitimate reason for the 
discharge, a plaintiff may nevertheless prevail if an illegitimate 
reason ‘more likely than not’ motivated the discharge decision.”93 
Holtzman’s case was remanded.94 
b. Lundquist v. Rice Memorial Hospital 
Rachael Lundquist was a registered nurse who was terminated 
by her employer, Rice Memorial Hospital, for inability to perform 
essential job duties. 95  Lundquist suffered a neck injury that 
impaired her lifting abilities. 96  Lundquist filed a workers’ 
compensation claim but was denied coverage, placed on 
unrequested medical leave, terminated, reinstated, and terminated 
again.97 The Hospital stated that both termination decisions were 
based on Lundquist’s inability to perform lifting work.98 However, 
Lundquist claimed that she was terminated in retaliation for filing a 
workers’ compensation claim. 99  Lundquist brought a claim for 
retaliation under the MWCA.100 
The district court characterized Lundquist’s burden at the 
McDonnell Douglas pretext stage as follows: “[T]he burden then 
shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that this proffered reason given 
by [the] defendant was a pretext to cover up the real reason for her 
termination—retaliation for her receipt of workers’ compensation 
                                                 
92.  Id. at *5. 
93.  Holtzman, 2002 WL 31012186, at *5 (quoting McGrath v. TCF Bank Savs., 
509 N.W.2d 365, 366 (Minn. 1993)).   
94.  Holtzman, 2002 WL 31012186, at *4. 
95.  Lundquist v. Rice Mem’l Hosp., No. A07-0683, 2008 WL 467439, at *1 
(Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 15, 2008). 
96.  Id. 
97.  Id. 
98.  Lundquist v. Rice Mem’l Hosp., No. 34-C5-00-299, 2007 WL 5688511, 
Findings of Fact 16 at A-52, Findings of Fact 26 at A55 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Jan. 30, 
2007).   
99.  See Lundquist, 2008 WL 467439, at *1. 
100.  Id. at *1–2. 
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benefits.” 101  Following a bench trial, the district court granted 
judgment for the Hospital.102 
Lundquist appealed, arguing that the district court had applied 
the wrong test for pretext. 103  The Minnesota Court of Appeals 
agreed that a motivating-factor test would have been proper.104 The 
court of appeals cited McGrath for the proposition that Lundquist 
“[could] sustain her burden of proof by showing that ‘an illegitimate 
reason “more likely than not” motivated the discharge decision.’”105 
Ultimately, the court of appeals upheld the district court’s decision 
because the district court’s factual findings demonstrated that 
Lundquist could not have prevailed even under a motivating-factor 
test.106 Nonetheless, the court of appeals did not adopt the district 
court’s reasoning that Lundquist could have only shown pretext by 
showing that discrimination was the single “real reason”—in other 
words, the but-for cause—of her discharge.107  
c. Schmidgall v. FilmTec Corp. and Abraham v. County of 
Hennepin 
Wanda Schmidgall worked for FilmTec Corporation. 108  She 
suffered three on-the-job injuries within a year.109 FilmTec had a 
“same-shift reporting” policy which required employees to report 
any on-the-job injury during the same shift in which it occurred.110 
FilmTec terminated Schmidgall after she failed to comply with the 
same-shift reporting policy for the third time.111 While it is unclear 
                                                 
101.  Lundquist, 2007 WL 5688511, at Conclusions of Law 5 at A-50 (emphasis 
added). 
102.  Id. at Order 1 at A-48.  
103.  See Lundquist, 2008 WL 467439, at *3. 
104.  See id. 
105.  Id. (citing McGrath v. TCF Bank Savs., 509 N.W.2d 365, 366 (Minn. 
1993)).  
106.  Lundquist, 2008 WL 467439, at *3. 
107.  Id.  
108.  Schmidgall v. FilmTec Corp., No. CX-01-1722, 2002 WL 655680, at *1 
(Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2002), aff’d on other grounds, 644 N.W.2d 801 (Minn. 
2002). 
109.  Id. 
110.  See id. 
111.  Id. 
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whether Schmidgall ever filed a workers’ compensation claim, she 
brought a claim for retaliation under the MWCA.112  
The trial court granted summary judgment for FilmTec.113 The 
trial court found that because Schmidgall committed misconduct by 
violating the same-shift reporting policy, Schmidgall could not 
prevail at the McDonnell Douglas pretext stage.114  
Schmidgall appealed, and the Minnesota Court of Appeals 
reversed.115 First, the court of appeals examined the trial court’s test 
for pretext.116 It noted that the trial court had apparently assumed 
that Schmidgall was required to prove that retaliation was the sole 
cause—that is, the but-for cause—of her discharge. 117  Because 
misconduct was also a cause, the trial court had reasoned, 
Schmidgall could not have prevailed. 118  The court of appeals 
criticized the trial court’s reasoning as a “misunderstanding of the 
final step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis.” 119  The court of 
appeals once again cited Anderson and McGrath’s motivating-
factor standard,120 noting that “[i]f Schmidgall can prove that it is 
more likely than not that she was discharged” to obstruct her from 
seeking workers’ compensation benefits or to retaliate against her 
for seeking them, “she can prevail on her retaliatory-discharge claim 
even if she was also discharged for violating the same-shift 
reporting rule.”121 
Schmidgall closely resembled the 1998 case of Abraham v. 
County of Hennepin, in which a Minnesota trial court had found that 
retaliation claims under the MWA and the MHRA could not 
proceed because the plaintiffs were discharged by their employer, 
                                                 
112.  See id. at *1–2. 
113.  Schmidgall, 2002 WL 655680, at *1. 
114.  See id. at *1–2. 
115.  Id. at *4. 
116.  Id. at *2–3. 
117.  Id. 
118.  Schmidgall, 2002 WL 655680, at *2–3. 
119.  Id. at *2. 
120.  Id. at *3 (citing Anderson v. Hunter, Keith, Marshall & Co., 417 N.W.2d 
619, 626–27 (Minn. 1988); McGrath v. TCF Bank Savs., 509 N.W.2d 365, 366 
(Minn. 1993)). 
121.  Id. at *3 (emphasis added). 
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Hennepin County, for employment misconduct.122 The trial court 
did not expressly apply a McDonnell Douglas analysis.123 However, 
the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed, noting that a McDonnell 
Douglas analysis was warranted and that the plaintiffs were not 
required to prove that retaliatory animus was the sole cause—that 
is, the but-for cause—of their terminations.124 The court of appeals 
noted that “[i]f retaliation motivated the county, [the plaintiffs] may 
prevail even though the county also had a legitimate reason for the 
discharges.”125 
The trial courts in Holtzman, Lundquist, and Schmidgall all 
purported to apply a McDonnell Douglas analysis to claims of 
employment discrimination and employment retaliation arising 
under Minnesota state law. Similarly, Abraham appeared to make a 
decision within the McDonnell Douglas framework, even though it 
did not expressly apply a McDonnell Douglas analysis. However, 
each trial court required the plaintiff to meet a higher burden of 
proof than the burden actually set by Minnesota law. Of these cases, 
the most alarming is probably Lundquist, which misstated 
Minnesota’s test for the McDonnell Douglas pretext stage a full 
fifteen years after McGrath was decided. 
Fortunately, in each case the court of appeals recognized the 
trial court’s error and reversed when necessary. None of the cases 
resulted in a published decision, and none of the cases resulted in 
review from the Minnesota Supreme Court regarding the court of 
appeals’ application of McDonnell Douglas.126  
d. A Possible Explanation: The Language of McDonnell Douglas 
Notably, the trial courts in Holtzman, Lundquist, Schmidgall, 
and Abraham shared a common lexicon. Each court implied that the 
                                                 
122.  See Abraham v. Cty. of Hennepin, No. C8-97-1907, 1998 WL 202771, 
*1–4 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 1998), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other 
grounds, 639 N.W.2d 342 (Minn. 2002). 
123.  See Abraham, 1998 WL 202771, at *4. 
124.  Id. 
125.  Id. at *4 (citing McGrath, 509 N.W.2d at 366 (quoting Anderson, 417 
N.W.2d at 627)) (emphasis added). 
126.  Abraham and Schmidgall were both reviewed by the Minnesota Supreme 
Court, but neither appeal involved the application of the McDonnell Douglas test. 
See generally Abraham v. Cty. of Hennepin, 639 N.W.2d 342 (Minn. 2002); 
Schmidgall v. FilmTec Corp., 644 N.W.2d 801 (Minn. 2002). 
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plaintiff needed to prove that his or her employer had a single 
motive—discriminatory or retaliatory animus—for the plaintiff’s 
termination. In Holtzman, the plaintiff had to prove that 
“discrimination was the real reason [for the discharge].” 127 
Similarly, in Lundquist, the plaintiff had to prove that the 
defendant’s proffered reason was “a pretext to cover up the real 
reason for her termination.”128  In Schmidgall and Abraham, the 
plaintiffs had to prove that their terminations were solely motivated 
by animus, independent of their misconduct.129 This type of single-
motive test is functionally a but-for test. It presumes that 
discriminatory or retaliatory animus do not make an employer’s 
action illegal unless the animus is outcome-determinative. 
Several other Minnesota cases employ the same lexicon even 
while applying the proper motivating-factor test. Fletcher v. St. Paul 
Pioneer Press, a leading case on retaliation under the MHRA, 
characterizes the plaintiff’s burden at the McDonnell Douglas 
pretext stage as “show[ing] that the proffered reasons were not the 
true reason for the [adverse employment] action.” 130  This 
formulation implies that an employer has only one motivation for 
its actions. Other courts have suggested that plaintiffs must “refute” 
the employer’s proffered reason rather than providing evidence of 
coexisting motives, 131  demonstrate pretext in addition to 
demonstrating that improper motives were a causative factor in the 
adverse employment decision,132 or show that animus motivated an 
employer “rather than” a lawful reason.133 All of these formulations 
                                                 
127 .  Holtzman v. HealthPartners Servs., Inc., No. C7-02-375, 2002 WL 
31012186, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 10, 2002) (quoting St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. 
v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993)) (emphasis added). 
128.  Lundquist v. Rice Mem’l Hosp., No. 34-C5-00-299, 2007 WL 5688511, 
Findings of Fact 5 at A-50 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Jan. 30, 2007) (emphasis added). 
129.  Schmidgall v. FilmTec Corp., No. CX-01-1722, 2002 WL 655680, at *2 
(Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2002), aff’d on other grounds, 644 N.W.2d 801 (Minn. 
2002); Abraham v. Cty. of Hennepin, No. C8-97-1907, 1998 WL 202771, at *3–
4 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 1998), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 
639 N.W.2d 342 (Minn. 2002). 
130.  589 N.W.2d 96, 102 (Minn. 1999) (emphasis added). 
131.  VanGinsven v. City of Canby, No. C9-00-969, 2000 WL 1778310, at *2–
3 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2000) (internal quotations omitted). 
132.  See Carter v. Peace Officers Standards & Training Bd., 558 N.W.2d 267, 
272 (Minn. 1997). 
133.  See Pinson v. Grazzoni Bros. & Co., No. A03-1567, 2004 WL 1254117, 
at *7 (Minn. Ct. App. May 28, 2004). 
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suggest that the plaintiff’s burden is greater than merely 
demonstrating that discriminatory or retaliatory animus was a 
motivating factor in an employment decision. They resemble 
language from federal case law requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate 
that an employer’s “proffered legitimate reasons were not what 
actually motivated its conduct.”134 In other words, they require a 
plaintiff to prove that retaliatory or discriminatory animus was the 
sole and but-for cause of an employer’s action.  
This language is understandable to a certain degree because it is 
the language of McDonnell Douglas itself. McDonnell Douglas 
characterized the pretext stage as allowing plaintiffs to unmask an 
employer’s “coverup” of its illegitimate motive. 135  McDonnell 
Douglas implied that an employer’s actions can be explained by a 
single determinative motive. 136  Accordingly, Minnesota courts 
looking to McDonnell Douglas itself will find language that tends 
to suggest a but-for test. However, Anderson and McGrath have 
modified the plaintiff’s burden at the McDonnell Douglas pretext 
stage in ways that McDonnell Douglas itself does not describe. 
Thus, in most cases, terminology that implies that an employer has 
a single, outcome-determinative motivation for a given employment 
decision overstates the plaintiff’s burden at the pretext stage.  
2. Application of a But-For Test at the Eighth Circuit 
While the Minnesota Court of Appeals has reversed district-
court cases that applied an incorrect test at the McDonnell Douglas 
pretext stage, it cannot reverse federal cases. Unfortunately, a recent 
federal case applying the McDonnell Douglas test to claims arising 
under Minnesota law has applied a functional but-for test rather than 
the motivating-factor test that Minnesota law provides.137  
                                                 
134.  See Batson v. Salvation Army, 897 F.3d 1320, 1331 (11th Cir. 2018) 
(quoting Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1538 (11th Cir. 1997)). 
135.  McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 793, 805 (1973) (“[O]n the 
retrial respondent must be given a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate by 
competent evidence that the presumptively valid reasons for his rejection were in 
fact a coverup for a racially discriminatory decision”). 
136.  Id. 
137.  See Naguib v. Trimark Hotel Corp., 903 F.3d 806, 811–12 (8th Cir. 2018). 
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a. Requiring Plaintiffs to Disprove an Employer’ s Proffered 
Reason 
In a recent case involving retaliation claims under the MHRA, 
the Eighth Circuit has described the plaintiff’s burden at the 
McDonnell Douglas pretext stage as both discrediting the 
employer’s asserted reason and creating a reasonable inference that 
retaliatory animus was “the real reason” for the adverse 
employment action.138 The Eighth Circuit’s test produced different 
results than the plaintiff would likely have obtained in state court. 
In Naguib v. Trimark Hotel Corp., Isis Naguib alleged that she was 
terminated from employment as a housekeeping manager at 
Millennium Hotel in retaliation for actions such as providing 
deposition testimony that might have been detrimental to 
Millennium in past litigation.139 However, Millennium stated that 
Naguib was terminated for requiring employees to under-report 
their overtime hours.140 The Eighth Circuit held that Naguib could 
not prevail at the McDonnell Douglas pretext stage because she 
“ha[d] not discredited Millennium’s version of events.”141 In other 
words, because Naguib failed to prove that Millennium’s proffered 
reason was false (and thus that unlawful animus was the only reason 
for her discharge), Naguib was unable to survive the McDonnell 
Douglas pretext stage.142 
Naguib resembles the Minnesota trial courts’ decisions in 
Schmidgall and Abraham. In each of those cases, the trial court 
required the plaintiff to show that an employer’s proffered reason 
for discharging him or her—employment misconduct—was 
untrue.143 Like the Eighth Circuit, the Schmidgall and Abraham trial 
courts effectively required plaintiffs to show that unlawful animus 
                                                 
138.  Naguib, 903 F.3d at 811 (citing Pedersen v. Bio-Med. Applications of 
Minn., 775 F.3d 1049, 1055 (Minn. Ct. App. 2015)). 
139.  Naguib, 903 F.3d at 809–10. 
140.  Id. at 811. 
141.  Id. at 812. 
142.  See id. 
143.  Schmidgall v. FilmTec Corp., No. CX-01-1722, 2002 WL 655680, at *2 
(Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2002), aff’d on other grounds, 644 N.W.2d 801 (Minn. 
2002); Abraham v. Cty. of Hennepin, No. C8-97-1907, 1998 WL 202771, at *3–
4 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 1998), aff’d in part and rev’d on other grounds, 639 
N.W.2d 342 (Minn. 2002). 
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was the sole cause of their terminations.144 However, Schmidgall 
and Abraham were reversed on appeal.145 In each case, the court of 
appeals reiterated that the plaintiff could prevail at the McDonnell 
Douglas pretext stage if the plaintiff had been discharged for an 
unlawful reason, even if the employer also had a legitimate reason 
for the discharge. 146  In state court, Naguib might well have 
prevailed at the pretext stage because she would been required only 
to demonstrate that retaliatory animus was a motivating factor in her 
termination.  
b. Expressly rejecting the motivating-factor test through 
“determinative-factor” causation 
The Eighth Circuit has also described the plaintiff’s burden at 
the McDonnell Douglas pretext stage as discrediting the employer's 
proffered reason and creating a reasonable inference that unlawful 
animus was a “determinative factor” in the employer’s adverse 
decision.147 Determinative-factor causation implies a different test 
than motivating-factor causation. In a recent case involving Title 
VII retaliation, the Eighth Circuit used the term “determinative 
factor” as a proxy for the but-for causation test required for Title 
VII retaliation claims. 148  It expressly contrasted this term with 
motivating-factor causation. 149  The Eighth Circuit has applied 
determinative-factor causation to discrimination and retaliation 
claims under the MHRA.150  
The Eighth Circuit’s divergence from Minnesota’s motivating-
factor standard is problematic because Minnesota district courts 
occasionally cite to Eighth Circuit cases in articulating the proper 
                                                 
144.  Id. 
145.  Schmidgall, 2002 WL 655680, at *4; Abraham, 1998 WL 202771, at *5. 
146.  Schmidgall, 2002 WL 655680, at *3; Abraham, 1998 WL 202771, at *4.  
147.  See, e.g., Rothmeier v. Inv. Advisers, Inc., 85 F.3d 1328, 1328 (8th Cir. 
1996).   
148.  Carrington v. City of Des Moines, 481 F.3d 1046, 1053 (8th Cir. 2007) 
(“At summary judgment, [the plaintiff] must show a ‘genuine issue of material 
fact’ that the City's stated reason for the discharge is pretextual and that retaliation 
was a determinative—not merely a motivating—factor. The record does not 
support such an inference, and this court declines to adopt [the plaintiff’s] 
weakened standard”). 
149.  Id. 
150.  Macias Soto v. Cork-Mark Int’l, Inc., 521 F.3d 837, 841 (8th Cir. 2008) 
(retaliation); Cronquist v. City of Minneapolis, 237 F.3d 920, 926 (8th Cir. 2001) 
(retaliation); Rothmeier, 85 F.3d at 1336–37 (age discrimination). 
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test for the McDonnell Douglas pretext stage. While it does not 
appear that any state courts have actually applied a but-for standard 
or have purported to apply determinative-factor causation, there is 
a risk that Minnesota courts may assume the standards are 
interchangeable and may subject plaintiffs’ claims to the very 
standards rejected in Anderson and McGrath. 
IV. WHAT TEST SHOULD MINNESOTA APPLY? 
Minnesota courts—and federal courts applying Minnesota 
law—have not always faithfully applied the McDonnell Douglas 
test as directed in Anderson and McGrath. As a result, there is a 
need for clarity about what test should be applied to claims arising 
under state law, regardless of which court applies the test. This 
clarification could come from Minnesota appellate courts reiterating 
the need to differentiate between state and federal standards at the 
McDonnell Douglas pretext stage. However, it could also involve 
legislative action specifying the appropriate causation standard, as 
Congress did when it amended Title VII to create a motivating-
factor standard for discrimination claims.151    
Notably, there are compelling reasons to adopt a but-for test for 
state-law causes of action whose federal counterparts are analyzed 
under a but-for standard. However, in light of the broad employee-
protective purposes of state laws such as the MHRA, the better 
public policy is to retain the motivating-factor standard. 
A.  Reasons to Adopt a But-For Test 
To simplify the confusion caused by federal cases construing 
Minnesota law, Minnesota could directly adopt a but-for causation 
test at the state level. In fact, Minnesota routinely looks to parallel 
Title VII law in interpreting the MHRA.152 The statutes have similar 
language and a similar purpose,153 and applying a uniform causation 
standard for federal and state-law causes of action would promote a 
                                                 
151.  See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 360 (2013). 
152 .  See, e.g., Danz v. Jones, 263 N.W.2d 395, 399–400 (Minn. 1978) 
(adopting the McDonnell Douglas analysis for disparate treatment claims); Bhd. 
of Ry. and S.S. Clerks v. State, 229 N.W.2d 3, 9–11 (Minn. 1975) (longstanding 
discriminatory employment systems are not “grandfathered in” under the 
MHRA). 
153.  Hubbard v. United Press Int’l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428, 441 (Minn. 1983). 
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clearer understanding among employers and employees about the 
scope and boundaries of employee civil rights. Notably, the MHRA 
and the MWA prohibit discrimination and retaliation “because of” 
an employee’s protected traits or “because” an employee engaged 
in statutorily-protected conduct. 154  A but-for test would be 
consistent with other cases holding that the word “because” implies 
a but-for causation standard.155 
Adopting the federal standard at the state level would alleviate 
a second concern: the existence of dual causation standards for 
state-law claims depending on whether the claims are heard in state 
or federal court. Plaintiffs frequently claim that an employment 
action violated both state and federal antidiscrimination laws.156 
Additionally, a lawsuit involving state-law discrimination or 
retaliation claims may end up in federal court because it implicates 
other federal statutes such as ERISA.157 As Naguib demonstrates, 
plaintiffs in federal court may have to prove but-for causation at the 
McDonnell Douglas pretext stage even if they would only need to 
prove motivating-factor causation in state court.158 Adopting a but-
for standard at the state level would eliminate the disparity between 
Minnesota’s application of a motivating-factor test to state-law 
claims and federal courts’ applications of a but-for test to the same 
claims. 
Finally, adopting a uniform standard would minimize the 
likelihood of juror confusion at trial. Employment discrimination 
and retaliation questions present complex factual issues. 159  The 
                                                 
154.  See MINN. STAT. §§ 363A.08, subdiv. 2, and 181.932, subdiv. 1 (2018). 
155.  See, e.g., Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009); Gentry 
v. E.W. Partners Club Mgmt. Co., 816 F.3d 228, 235–36 (4th Cir. 2016). 
156.  See, e.g., Pedersen v. Bio-Med. Applications of Minn., 775 F.3d 1049, 
1051 (8th Cir. 2015) (retaliation under Title VII and the MWA); Torgerson v. 
City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1035 (8th Cir. 2011) (race discrimination under 
Title VII and the MHRA); Hervey v. Cty. of Koochiching, 527 F.3d 711, 715 (8th 
Cir. 2008) (sex discrimination and retaliation under Title VII and the MHRA); 
Heimbach v. Reidman Corp., 175 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1175 (8th Cir. 2001) 
(disability discrimination under the ADA and the MHRA); Wilking v. Cty. of 
Ramsey, 153 F.3d 869, 872 (8th Cir. 1998) (disability discrimination under the 
ADA and the MHRA); Rothmeier v. Inv. Advisers, Inc., 85 F.3d 1328, 1331 (8th 
Cir. 1996) (age discrimination under the ADEA and the MHRA). 
157.  See Naguib v. Trimark Hotel Corp., 903 F.3d 806, 812 (8th Cir. 2018). 
158.  See id. at 811 (citing Pedersen, 775 F.3d at 1055).  
159.  See Sigurdson v. Isanti Cty., 386 N.W.2d 715, 721 (Minn. 1986). Indeed, 
the factual complexity of employment-discrimination cases was one reason the 
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United States Supreme Court has noted that workplace-
discrimination claims are especially complex for juries. 160  That 
complexity is heightened when jurors must decide claims under 
competing theories of liability.161 Adopting a single standard for 
analyzing claims at the pretext stage would prevent issue confusion 
and the need for complex, multi-part jury instructions.  
B.  Problems with Adopting a But-For Test 
Despite the appeal of uniformity, adopting a but-for test under 
Minnesota’s antidiscrimination and antiretaliation laws poses 
problems. First of all, adopting a but-for test would not guarantee 
uniformity with federal law. Some federal statutes—notably the 
ADA and the discrimination provisions of Title VII—do not apply 
a but-for causation test.162 Accordingly, the benefits of adopting a 
uniform standard for the McDonnell Douglas pretext stage would 
not affect litigation involving state-law causes of action and parallel 
provisions of the ADA or Title VII’s discrimination section. This 
lessened impact is significant because complaints of disability 
discrimination and race discrimination—both of which would be 
covered by the ADA and/or Title VII’s discrimination provisions—
are among the most common MHRA complaints raised in 
Minnesota.163   
                                                 
Minnesota Supreme Court required district courts to make explicit findings at 
each stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis. See id. at 721–22. 
160.  Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S.Ct. 2434, 2451 (2013) (“Courts and 
commentators alike have opined on the need for reasonably clear jury instructions 
in employment discrimination cases. And the danger of juror confusion is 
particularly high where the jury is faced with instructions on alternative theories 
of liability under which different parties bear the burden of proof”). 
161.  Id. 
162.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). The Supreme Court has not reached the issue 
of the ADA’s causation standard, although federal Circuits have concluded that 
but-for causation applies. See Gentry v. E. W. Partners Club Mgmt. Co, 816 F.3d 
228, 235–36 (4th Cir. 2016); Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 
957, 961–62 (7th Cir. 2010).    
163 .  MDHR Enforcement Case Summaries: MDHR Cases with Probable 
Cause Determinations, 2011-2015, MINN. DEP’T OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 7 (Feb. 
2016), https://mn.gov/mdhr/assets/Case_Summaries_Report_tcm1061-
229708.pdf [https://perma.cc/5B5A-Y794]. Notably, this report focused on 
complaints filed with the Minnesota Department of Human Rights (MDHR), the 
state agency responsible for enforcing the MHRA, and not on private litigation. 
However, the high number of complaints filed for race and disability 
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Second, adopting a but-for test would reduce the scope of 
Minnesota employees’ civil rights. But-for causation implies 
different substantive rights than motivating-factor causation. But-
for causation means that civil rights functionally protect employees 
only when an employer’s discriminatory or retaliatory animus is 
outcome-determinative. Under cases like Naguib, a discrimination 
or retaliation plaintiff may lose even a meritorious case because her 
employer had a coexisting lawful motive. 164  Motivating-factor 
causation, on the other hand, means that civil rights are violated 
when unlawful animus plays a role in an employer’s decision, even 
if the role is not outcome-determinative. Motivating-factor 
causation implies a broader scope of employee rights: the right 
against inclusion of unlawful considerations in an employer’s 
decision making, even if the employer could justify its decision on 
separate grounds. 
This broad scope of civil rights—freedom from unlawful 
considerations—better promotes the purpose of Minnesota’s 
antidiscrimination and antiretaliation laws. The stated public policy 
of the MHRA, for example, is “to secure for persons in this 
state . . . freedom from discrimination” in areas of activity including 
employment.165 The MHRA creates a statutory civil right to the 
“opportunity to obtain employment . . . without such discrimination 
as is prohibited by this chapter.” 166  The legislature’s broad 
language—“freedom from discrimination” and 
“without . . . discrimination”—implies that discriminatory decision 
making is intolerable even if a discriminatory decision could be 
justified on other grounds. “Freedom from discrimination” means 
freedom from discriminatory processes, not just discriminatory 
outcomes.  
Finally, motivating-factor causation better accounts for the 
practical reality that employers often have multiple motives for a 
single decision. It is not difficult for employers to articulate a 
                                                 
discrimination can provide a rough proxy to estimate the proportion of race- and 
disability-related complaints likely to be litigated. Moreover, the next-most-
common claims field with the MDHR are claims of gender or sex discrimination 
and age discrimination, which could also be covered by Title VII’s discrimination 
provisions. 
164.  See Naguib v. Trimark Hotel Corp., 903 F.3d 806, 812 (8th Cir. 2018). 
165.  MINN. STAT. § 363A.02, subdiv. 1 (2018). 
166.  Id. at subdiv. 2. 
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nondiscriminatory or nonretaliatory reason for an employment 
action. 167  Many can suggest several. 168  McGrath and Anderson 
emphasized that the purpose of the motivating-factor standard was 
to prevent employers who were “definitionally guilty of prohibited 
employment discrimination” or retaliation from escaping liability 
by proving that “other legitimate reasons may coincidentally exist 
that could have justified” the employer’s discriminatory or 
retaliatory action.169 The motivating-factor standard accounts for 
this practical reality by clarifying that a plaintiff’s claim can prevail 
even if the employer had a coexisting lawful motive for its 
actions.170 
V. CONCLUSION 
Minnesota has long utilized a plaintiff-friendly “motivating-
factor” standard at the pretext stage of the McDonnell Douglas test. 
This standard allows plaintiffs to prevail on employment 
discrimination or retaliation claims where an employer’s 
discriminatory or retaliatory animus was a factor in the employer’s 
action, rather than the but-for cause of an employer’s action. 
However, some Minnesota courts have eroded the motivating-factor 
test by applying a functional but-for test or characterizing the test in 
language that suggests a but-for test. Federal courts deciding 
discrimination and retaliation claims arising under Minnesota law 
have applied a but-for test rather than the proper motivating-factor 
test. 
Minnesota courts should reiterate that the motivating-factor 
standard is the appropriate test for causation at the McDonnell 
Douglas pretext stage without reference to but-for causation 
principles. The Minnesota legislature would do well to consider 
adding express statutory language to the MHRA, the MWCA, and 
the MWA directing courts to consider plaintiff’s claims under a 
motivating-factor standard. The motivating-factor standard better 
                                                 
167.  See Shifting Burdens, supra note 32, at 1587. 
168.  See, e.g., Temple v. Metro. Council, 2017 WL 6272716, at *4 (Minn. Ct. 
App. Dec. 11, 2017) (employee was told he was discharged for (1) failing to 
properly perform duties; (2) secretly recording conversations; (3) 
insubordination; (4) failure to provide required notifications; and (5) falsification 
of records). 
169.  Anderson v. Hunter, Keith, Marshall, & Co., 417 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Minn. 
1988); see also McGrath, 509 N.W.2d 365, 366 (Minn. 1993). 
170.  See id. 
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accounts for the practical reality that employers often have multiple 
reasons for a single employment decision and better safeguards the 
employee-protective policies underlying Minnesota’s workplace 
discrimination and retaliation statutes. 
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